Brands
Cyberattack hits 178 organisations through compromised Optimizely code
Malicious JavaScript targets websites including BBC, CNN and HSBC, stealing payment data and cryptocurrency
MUMBAI: A trusted website link turned into a digital backdoor, and some of the world’s biggest brands found themselves on the wrong side of it. A cyberattack involving malicious JavaScript affected 178 organisations globally on 16 November 2026, compromising website visitors through code distributed via Optimizely, according to cybersecurity firm Report URI.
The affected organisations include prominent names such as the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, HSBC and IKEA. Other websites identified by the Lancashire-based web security company include GitLab, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock, spanning sectors from media and financial services to travel, technology and retail.
The attack was designed to do considerably more than disrupt website access. The malicious software attempted to redirect cryptocurrency payments to digital wallets controlled by attackers, capture payment card information, steal website cookies and take screenshots. It also attempted to deploy the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits on Apple devices, including iPhones and iPads.
Report URI said cryptocurrency had already been stolen and that transactions redirected to the attackers’ wallets had been confirmed. The incident therefore involved not just an attempted intrusion, but confirmed financial theft.
The breach centred on Optimizely Web, a platform that organisations use to experiment with website layouts, personalise user experiences and optimise digital performance.
Websites using the service load a JavaScript snippet hosted on Optimizely’s content delivery network (CDN). This allows the platform’s code to run on customer websites. An optional feature, known as Project JavaScript, lets customers add their own custom instructions through the Optimizely dashboard. That code can then run across the pages of a website.
According to Report URI, attackers inserted malicious instructions into the Project JavaScript sections of customer accounts. Crucially, they did not need to replace the entire integration or make obvious changes to the rest of the code. The compromised scripts continued to be delivered through Optimizely’s existing CDN and security certificate.
That made the attack particularly concerning. The malicious code was being served from a domain that the affected websites already trusted, rather than from an unfamiliar or obviously suspicious external source.
For visitors, this meant that simply accessing an affected website could expose them to malicious activity. The attack exploited the trust organisations place in third-party services that are integrated into their websites, rather than necessarily requiring attackers to break directly into each company’s own website infrastructure.
The malicious JavaScript was built to carry out several types of activity, giving attackers multiple opportunities to steal information or divert transactions.
One of its targets was cryptocurrency payments. The code attempted to replace legitimate wallet destinations with addresses controlled by the attackers, potentially redirecting funds before users completed transactions.
It also attempted to capture payment card details, steal website cookies and take screenshots. Stolen cookies can potentially expose information linked to a user’s website session, while screenshots may provide attackers with additional information about what a visitor is viewing or entering.
The attempted deployment of the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits added another layer to the incident. These tools were aimed at Apple devices, including iPhones and iPads, potentially extending the threat beyond desktop browsers.
Report URI founder Scott Helme described the incident as a major attack in a post on X, highlighting the distribution of malicious JavaScript through Optimizely to some of the world’s largest websites. He pointed to the range of activities, from cryptocurrency theft and payment card skimming to attempts to target iOS devices.
The incident has also prompted responses from affected organisations.
Salesforce said it was investigating unauthorised changes to its Optimizely scripts and had disabled them as a precaution. Equifax also launched an investigation and stopped using Optimizely, while stating that it had found no evidence of a breach of its own systems.
Report URI said most of the malicious code had since been removed. However, the scale of the incident raises questions about how organisations monitor the third-party scripts running on their websites and how quickly they can identify suspicious changes.
The attack highlights a difficult security problem for businesses operating increasingly complex digital platforms. Websites routinely depend on external tools for analytics, advertising, personalisation, experimentation, customer engagement and payment processing. These integrations can make websites more flexible and efficient, but they also introduce dependencies beyond an organisation’s direct control.
A compromise of one trusted service can potentially create exposure across multiple customer websites. In this case, the attackers reportedly exploited custom JavaScript configurations within Optimizely accounts, allowing malicious instructions to travel through an established delivery channel.
It also demonstrates why a website’s security cannot be judged solely by the strength of its own infrastructure. Even when a company’s internal systems have not been directly breached, third-party code running in visitors’ browsers can create a route for data theft and financial fraud.
For organisations, the incident reinforces the need to monitor changes to third-party scripts, restrict access to custom-code functions, review external integrations and have procedures to disable compromised services quickly.
For consumers, the episode is a reminder that a familiar brand name or a legitimate website address does not automatically make every element running behind the page safe. As businesses rely more heavily on external digital services, the security of the entire supply chain becomes as important as protecting the website itself.









