| For example, if a cable op were paying a MSO Rs 100
for the area serviced, then, according to this option, the cable op
would pay Rs 105.
The drawback of this system is that the present disadvantages of
the system would continue, while the consumer is unlikely to have
a variety of choices. Moreover, this formula would not be able to
compete with the introduction of new technologies like KU-band DTH.
OPTION No. 2: This formula can be adopted where TRAP-ping the prices
in a limited way is the objective.
Under this formula, the services could be divided in two tiers.
The first tier would comprise the free to air channels, priced at
Rs 72+5 per cent annual hike.
The second tier would comprise all the existing pay channels. This
tier could be priced through a formula:
Rs. 72+5%+Rs. 5 (service cost for putting the TRAP system)+ X where
`X' would denote the price of a pay channel to be decided by the
broadcaster.
Any new pay channel after a particular notified date would be available
only through set-top boxes.
The problems that are likely to be encountered if this option is
taken that the revenue share disputes would continue unsolved and
TRAP (a limited edition of a full-fledged addressable system received
through a box) is not completely foolproof or hack-proof.
OPTION No. 3: CAS is made mandatory, but done so in consultation
with respective state governments.
Drawbacks would be that to make such a formula in a country like
India to really succeed heavy regulation and stringent implementation
would be necessary, even as the issue of who'll-buy-the-box persists.
The regulator's recommendations, which may still see some changes
being effected, does quote Taiwan's example in case of price control.
In Taiwan, the price of the basic tier is regulated.
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